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PART I—INTRODUCTION
The contemporary globalization project is facilitated and stimulated in
large part by multilateral trade liberalization.1 In tandem with—and sometimes
as an alternative to—stalled multilateral trade negotiations, states rush to enter
into a veritable explosion of regional trade arrangements (RTAs).2 The trade
1. As used in this article, globalization means the increasing interdependence,
interconnection and intertwining of the economies of individual states. While globalization is not
new (throughout centuries of human history successive waves of globalization have brought
different regions of the world in greater contact—for example, Africa, the Western Hemisphere
and Europe were brought in closer contact via the trans-Atlantic slave trade), the technological
advances of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have quickened and deepened the
relationships among widely dispersed states.
2. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
pts. 4, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947], provides that member states may enter into
regional trading arrangements without violating obligations under the GATT so long as certain
provisions are followed. As of July 2008, 380 RTAs had been notified to the World Trade
Organization (WTO). According to the WTO web site, close to 400 RTAs are scheduled for
implementation by 2010. See Regional Trade Agreements, http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/region
_e/region_e.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (in Annex 1A to the WTO – Multilateral
Trade Agreements on Goods), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [GATT 1994], incorporates GATT
1947, as well as legal instruments set forth in GATT 1994 which had entered into force pursuant
to GATT 1947 prior to the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
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liberalization begun at Bretton Woods, enhanced by successive rounds of
negotiations,3 and to which much of the world is now committed,4 is focused
on lowering barriers to the movement of goods, capital, services and ideas,
including legal cultures.5 Trade theorists and supporters of free trade claim
that liberalization of the movement of goods, capital, services and ideas
stimulates efficient, competitive and productive economic activity that will
ultimately accrue to the benefit of all participants. Yet, the liberalization of
labor (and the consequent movement of human beings) is a neglected and
feared aspect of multilateral and regional trade liberalization policies and
agreements.
Despite deeply held concerns and the expected difficulty of transition,
labor liberalization is a necessary and inevitable aspect of trade liberalization.6
Contrary to the assumptions underlying the structure of the contemporary
model of trade liberalization, labor liberalization is not called for only in the
context of deepened regional integration—specifically the formation of a
common market.7 On the contrary, if all participating economies and
economic actors are to experience the promised benefits of trade liberalization
so as to harness economic theory and forces for the benefit of a broader
constituency, including human labor, then labor liberalization must be
recognized and facilitated as an integral part of trade liberalization.8

Organization, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter the WTO Agreement]. Unless
specific reference is made to GATT 1947 or GATT 1994, references to “the GATT” include both
GATT 1947 and GATT 1994, as well as the institutional framework created pursuant to the
agreements.
3. The structured multilateral negotiations conducted by GATT members have addressed
and attempted to remove or minimize innumerable barriers to trade liberalization. The first eight
rounds of negotiations culminated with the formation of the World Trade Organization, among
other trade liberalization achievements. See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE
LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND U.S. LAW 5–7 (1998). The
member states have missed the targeted completion dates of the current round of negotiations, the
Doha Development Round, but negotiations continue to be held. See, e.g., The Doha Agenda,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
4. As of May 16, 2008, 152 of the world’s 192 states have acceded to the WTO. See
Ukraine Becomes the WTO’s 152nd Member, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/
acc_urk_may08_e.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
5. The Uruguay Round of negotiations that resulted in the creation of the World Trade
Organization added the liberalization of trade in services and the recognition and enforcement of
a U.S.-dominated conception of intellectual property rights.
6. See infra Part II.C (elaborating this article’s concept of labor liberalization, which seeks
to liberate labor from conceptual and constructed constraints on mobility).
7. The European Union is the quintessential example of labor liberalization in the context
of the creation of a common market.
8. It is the achievement of human rights standards, which includes labor rights, that must be
the end goal of labor (and trade) liberalization. Standing alone, the liberalization of labor within
the context of trade liberalization cannot achieve the equitable distribution of the benefits to be
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Labor is one of the basic factors of production identified in classical and
neoclassical economic theory. In the face of the economic distortions that stem
from the neglect of the liberalization of this fundamental input of economic
production, trade liberalization cannot succeed in its espoused purpose of
increased economic efficiency and productivity and enhanced standard of
living benefits That neglect has not succeeded in preventing the movement of
labor (people) attempting to respond to the economic incentives and
disincentives arising from trade liberalization and the forces of globalization.
Instead, the intertwined neglect and prohibition of labor liberalization by state
parties to multilateral and regional trade liberalization treaties create and
maintain incentives that drive underground and form the basis of illicit
exploitative markets that are sustained by the obstructed movement of labor.
Regional trading arrangements, which create trade groupings of small
numbers of neighboring member states with greater homogeneity of cultures,
economies and interests, would appear to provide opportunities for
experimentation in this neglected area of the contemporary multilateral trade
liberalization and globalization project. However, with the remarkable
exception of the European Union, states have failed to take advantage of the
opportunity to experiment with labor liberalization even within the more
controlled context of regional trading arrangements.
Instead, state participants in regional trading arrangements appear to
contemplate the liberalization of labor solely within the context of a drive
toward deeper integration of member state economies.9 In the Western
Hemisphere, even within the context of planned enhanced integration of
economies and proposed labor liberalization initiatives, the implementation of
labor liberalization is a stillborn part of a rhetoric that has not yet become
actuality. However, the benefits anticipated from the efforts toward the
liberalization of the movement of goods, services and capital are incomplete
where the liberalization of labor is not also undertaken.
The commitments made toward labor liberalization within regional trading
arrangements in the Western Hemisphere have, to date, been timid in

gained from trade liberalization. Labor liberalization must be implemented in tandem with the
formation and enforcement of human rights standards. The right of labor to exit and enter
domestic markets will strengthen labor’s ability to enforce adherence to labor and other human
rights standards.
9. That is, only within the context of the creation of a common market, such as the
European Union’s freedom of movement for member state nationals. RTAs are usually
characterized as free trade areas, customs unions and common markets. See, e.g., Karen E.
Bravo, CARICOM, the Myth of Sovereignty and Aspirational Economic Integration, 31 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 145, 156–57 (2005) (discussing these typologies). RTAs can also be
distinguished according to other metrics, such as the type of regional institution building, the
creation of or failure to create regional institutions with supranational legal personality and the
types and effectiveness of dispute resolution procedures, as well as other factors.
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conceptualization and half-hearted in execution due in part to economic, social,
political and conceptual barriers. This article examines the treatment of labor
liberalization in four key regional trading arrangements in the Western
Hemisphere: the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Common Market of
the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade
Agreement (DR-CAFTA). This article also identifies the consequences of the
failure to address this key aspect of trade liberalization.
Part II briefly summarizes the contemporary multilateral trade
liberalization project with a focus on the neglect of labor liberalization. Part
III examines the rhetoric and reality of labor liberalization in the four major
Western Hemisphere regional trading arrangements, while Part IV identifies
and analyzes the barriers to execution of such liberalization. Part V posits that
the opportunities to experiment with labor liberalization in the Western
Hemisphere within regional trading arrangements are not irrevocably lost. The
conclusion summarizes the prospects and prerequisites for liberalization of
labor in the hemisphere and acknowledges prospective implementation and
transitional challenges.
PART II—THE DOMINANT ETHOS: TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITHOUT LABOR
LIBERALIZATION
A.

Background

David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage,10 bolstered by the
Hecksher-Ohlin theory’s insights regarding the role of factor endowments in
framing the comparative advantage of individual economies,11 forms the
theoretical foundation of contemporary multilateral and regional trade
liberalization. According to Ricardo, each producer (and economy) should
focus on the production of goods in which it has a comparative advantage visà-vis its trading partners.12 Hecksher-Ohlin added the insight that differences
in factor endowments—land, labor, capital—largely determined each
economy’s comparative advantage and, therefore, the productive activities in
which participating economies should engage.13 It naturally flows from the
identification of an economy’s comparative advantage, the logic of the theory
of comparative advantage, and the understanding of factor endowments, that
overall welfare will be increased when economies trade with each other to

10. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
172–74 (1987) (discussing and explaining David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage).
11. See generally BERTIL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1935).
Ohlin’s work rests in part on that of Eli Heckscher, hence the designation of “Hecksher-Ohlin.”
12. GILPIN, supra note 10, at 173–174.
13. See generally OHLIN, supra note 11.
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obtain the products that their individual factor endowments do not allow them
to produce as efficiently and cheaply as do their trading partners.14 By trading
and lowering barriers to trade among producers, factor endowments are more
efficiently utilized by the economic actors, both individually and as a group,
prices are lowered through competition and consumer choice is enhanced.
GATT 194715 and the Uruguay Round Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization16 are multilateral implementations of these
theories.17 Under GATT 1947, the Bretton Woods negotiators put in place
legal mechanisms to liberalize the movement of goods among signatory states
and instituted a negotiating apparatus for the successive lowering of tariffs and
non-tariff barriers to the movement of such goods.18 The Uruguay Round of
negotiations exponentially expanded the subjects and spheres of influence of
the trade liberalization ethos by encompassing the liberalization of capital,
services and legal concepts.19

14. See, e.g., Stephen Redding, Dynamic Comparative Advantage and the Welfare Effects of
Trade, 51 OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS 15, 17 (1999), available at http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/
cgi/reprint/51/1/15.
15. GATT 1947, supra note 2.
16. See the WTO Agreement, supra note 2. Major achievements of the Uruguay Round
included the formation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the Word Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf, and Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, id., available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf., both of which attack specific types of non-tariff barriers.
17. Pursuant to the WTO Agreement, GATT 1947 continues in force as a multilateral annex
to the WTO Agreement. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 8–12 (discussing and
summarizing the legal mechanisms of the transition from the GATT to the WTO, and the
incorporation of GATT obligations into the WTO regime).
18. The International Trade Organization, the stillborn institutional trade liberalization
equivalent of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, was to have oversight duties for the interpretation of the GATT. See United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Mar. 24, 1948, Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization [hereinafter Havana Charter], available at http://www.world
tradelaw.net/misc/havana/pdf. Cold War tensions prevented the formation of the ITO. See Paul
Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade
Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 125–27 (1996).
19. For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf, exported to all WTO member states the concepts of
intellectual property that had evolved in the Western World. See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, Has
Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the Internationalization of Intellectual
Property, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 111–12 (1995); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW 345, 347 (1995).
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In order to multi-lateralize the effects and endeavors of trade liberalization,
the adherents to GATT 1947 (and, subsequently, the member states of the
WTO) undertake to extend the trade preferences conferred on any single
member state or other trading partner to all member states.20 The mechanisms
employed are the nondiscrimination obligations of national treatment and most
favored nation, which require that the member states treat the goods and
services of other member states no less preferentially than domestic goods and
services are treated.21 In effect, each state party agrees to allow the goods and
services of WTO member states to compete within its territory on an equal
footing with one another and with the domestically produced “like,”
substitutable and/or competitive products and services.22

20. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. I, § 1. Article I of GATT 1947 spells out the most
favored nation obligation of member states:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation,
and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.
Id.
21. Id. art. III, §§ 1, 2. Article III of GATT 1947 lays out the National Treatment obligation.
Article III, section 1 and 2 specify that:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations
requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions,
should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
Id.
22. The jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body has fleshed out the criteria for likeness,
substitutability and nondiscrimination under the provisions of GATT 1947 and GATT 1994. See,
e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/D58/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996); WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea—Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (Jan. 18, 1999); Appellate Body
Report, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R (Dec. 13,
1999).
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A key exception to the non-discrimination doctrines is found in Article
XXIV of GATT 1947, which allows states parties to GATT 1947 (and
subsequently, WTO member states) to enter into regional trading arrangements
such as common markets, customs unions and free trade areas.23 Pursuant to
the exception, the member states may extend more preferential treatment to
members of the regional trading arrangement (in seemingly blatant violation of
the GATT’s non-discrimination provisions) so long as the net impact on trade
with the remaining member states who are non-parties to the regional trading
arrangements is not negative.24 Additionally, all such regional trading
arrangements are to be notified to and examined by the WTO.25

23. Article XXIV, sections 4 and 5 of GATT 1947 state:
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies
of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a
customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent
territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or
of a free-trade area . . . .
GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XXIV, §§, 4, 5. See infra Part III.A (discussing different types of
regional trading arrangements).
24. Article XXIV, sections 5(a) and 5(b) of GATT 1947 specify that the creation of the RTA
shall not impose new or additional barriers to trade for member states not party to the RTA:
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a
customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of
any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not
parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive
than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim
agreement, as the case may be;
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a
free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the
constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free–trade area or the
adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such
area or not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the
corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case
may be . . . .
GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XXIV, §§ 5(a)–(b).
25. Id. art. XXIV § 7(a). Member states are required to inform the WTO of their formation
of and/or participation in RTAs. Article XXIV, section 7(a) of GATT 1947 specifies that:
[a]ny contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an
interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify
the Contracting Parties and shall make available to them such information regarding the
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As a consequence of the exception provided by Article XXIV, regional
trading arrangements (and thus, regional trade liberalization) have flourished
alongside the multilateral trade liberalization encapsulated in and stimulated by
the GATT/WTO system. Seemingly counter intuitively,26 the period following
the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and
formation of the WTO has witnessed a remarkable increase in the creation of
regional trading arrangements.27
B.

An Incomplete Liberalization

Throughout this process of continual liberalization, the fundamental and
mostly unspoken underlying concept of labor as an immobile factor of
production (truly analogous to immobile land) has not been institutionally
challenged.28 The multilateral trade liberalization undertaken through the
WTO and most examples of regional trade liberalization (with the marked
exception of the European Union) have neglected the liberalization of labor.
That neglect betrays both fundamental trade liberalization theory and classical
and neoclassical economic theory.

proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to
contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.
Id. See also Chi Carmody, Metrics and the Measurement of International Trade: Some Thoughts
on the Early Operation of the WTO RTA Transparency Mechanism, 28 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV.
273 (2008) (discussing and analyzing the operation of the Uruguay Round notification
obligations).
26. The post-WTO increase in the formation of RTAs is counterintuitive in light of the
volume of trade affected by negotiated gains in the liberalization of trade attained through the
Uruguay Round. Yet the increasing resort to RTAs by member states representing every stage of
economic development suggests, among possible explanations, that the Uruguay Round
achievements do not satisfy the trading needs of the member states, that greater liberalization can
be achieved through RTAs, or that the factors driving the increase in RTA formation are not
solely related to trade considerations.
27. Compare the number of notifications for RTAs that preceded the WTO with the number
of notifications that have followed the WTO’s formation. See Regional Trade Agreements: Facts
and Figures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (displaying WTO chart
depicting the post-1994 surge in notifications of RTAs to the WTO) (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
28. Some developing countries have attempted to raise this issue in the context of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 283 [hereinafter
GATS], a multilateral annex to the WTO Agreement to which all WTO members must adhere,
but with limited success. See, e.g., Joy Kategekwa, Extension of Mode 4 Commitments to
Include Unskilled Workers in the WTO. A Win-Win situation, Especially for LDCs, Address at
the OECD Development Centre Panel on Migration and Development (Sept. 25–26, 2006),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/26/37501680.pdf (discussing requests of less
developed countries within the WTO negotiation frameworks to broaden the scope of GATS
Mode 4 provisions governing the provision of services through the presence of natural persons in
line with those countries’ comparative advantage).
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Pursuant to classical and neoclassical theory, labor is one of the principal
factors of production.29 Trade liberalization theory touts the welfare enhancing
benefits that are to be gained through removal of barriers to the movement of
both factor inputs (such as capital) and finished and unfinished products or
goods. However, the movement of labor, a fundamental production input, is
ignored. Instead, dominant trade liberalization policy efforts assume, without
examination, the immobility of labor as a factor of production. At the same
time, mass migratory movements by labor representing all levels of skills30
reveal a deep disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of trade
liberalization.
Through the mechanism of trade liberalization, economic forces and actors
are unleashed to act trans-nationally and globally. At the same time, via
neglect in trade liberalization policies and active construction of barriers, states
and some vested interests oppose and encumber the movement of labor. That
neglect constrains the ability of both individual workers and labor acting
collectively to respond fully to transnational economic stimuli or to participate
actively in globalization as autonomous economic actors.
Moreover, because labor may not easily undertake transnational movement
to either exit or enter individual domestic markets, this blind spot in trade
liberalization also stymies the ability of individual states to flexibly adjust the
factor inputs into their domestic economic production in response to changes in
the demand for labor.31 Labor liberalization would allow the unemployed in a

29. The other classical factors of production are capital and land. Additional inputs into
production include entrepreneurship and technology. Labor, of course, differs from the other
factors of production by virtue of its humanity and is more than a mere input into production.
The failure of the contemporary trade liberalization project to recognize and implement labor’s
equal status as a factor of production and to deploy a holistic economic conceptualization of labor
undermines the trade liberalization project. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
30. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI—2007 EDITION 132–134
(OECD2007) (discussing and charting the education levels of immigrants to OECD countries for
the years 2003–2004).
31. Worthy of further investigation but beyond the scope of this article is the question
whether the treatment of labor under the contemporary trade liberalization model betrays the
lingering influence of mercantilist sentiments in the mindset of nation state policymakers (and,
indeed, of trade theorists). Is the modern state’s retention and “ownership” of labor originating
within state borders a vestige of the mercantilist hoarding of “specie”? See, e.g., ROBERT B.
EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIZED ECONOMIES: MONARCHY, MONOPOLY,
AND MERCANTILISM 4 (1997) (“Among the most often stressed tenets of the mercantilists are the
equation of specie with wealth, regulation of the trade sector to produce specie inflow, and
emphasis upon population growth and low wages.”); R.J. BARRY JONES, CONFLICT AND
CONTROL IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC REALISM AND NEOMERCANTILISM 10 (1986) (describing “classical mercantilism” as being “primarily ‘bullionist’;
policy being directed toward the accumulation of bullion, specie and all other readily
transportable forms of wealth . . .”).
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labor-rich economy to find employment in labor-poor economies where such
employment openings may otherwise not have been filled. At the same time, a
labor-poor economy engaged in labor-intensive production would be able to
increase the availability of labor through labor liberalization policies that
welcome the influx of new labor.32
The failure to challenge the assumed immobility of labor flies in the face
of evidence of the adjustability and mutability of factor inputs and of
comparative advantage. For example, state intervention in adjusting the
quality, nature or characteristics of factor endowments may fundamentally
alter an economy’s comparative advantage.33 Alternatively, an economy that
is rich in labor but poor in capital may, through the import of capital, transform
its comparative advantage from production of low-capital to more
sophisticated capital-intensive products.34 In both cases, the flexibility and
ease of adoption of different policies by individual economies would be
enhanced by the liberalization of labor.
Furthermore, the increasing
interdependence of economies would be openly acknowledged in political and
economic discourse and policy making.
C. Labor Liberalization Explained
In the context of multilateral trade liberalization as currently implemented,
labor is conceptualized as subordinate to and/or subsumed within the
production of goods and services. The labor liberalization advocated here
would not commoditize labor in order to facilitate its increased exploitation in
economic activity by other actors, such as states or other entities. Instead, this
article’s advocacy of the liberalization of labor within the broader trade
liberalization project would free labor on three levels: First, labor would be
liberalized from its current conceptualization as a mere immobile input into the
production of goods and services. Second, labor would be liberalized from the
state border constraints that have sought to limit its trans-border movement and
have therefore rendered it more easily exploited. As an autonomous economic
unit, labor could seek out the markets where demand is highest and labor is
most highly valued and compensated. Third, labor liberalization would

32. An obvious example is the United States throughout most of its history: African slaves,
European immigrants (including indentured servants) and Asian and Latino laborers have
provided a much-needed and frequently involuntary labor supply during various eras.
33. Or, through government intervention in education, for example, an economy’s
qualitative comparative advantage in labor may be transformed from low-skilled to high-skilled
labor.
34. Similarly, through the import of technology and/or capital, an economy that is not amply
endowed with land may nevertheless efficiently utilize its land acreage for production of goods
that are more typically produced by an economy that is richly endowed with land as a factor of
production.
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democratize access to the benefits of trade liberalization by increasing labor’s
opportunities to seek out the newly created economic benefits. Freed of the
constructed state border barriers, labor would be liberalized to engage in its
own decision making and thereby conduct its own cost-benefit analysis and
choice of the utility of movement or non-movement to a new employment
market.
D. Consequences of the Omission of Labor Liberalization
The failure to liberalize labor results in distortive effects in the global
market for labor.35 While domestic capital producers and consumers are
allowed to respond to increased competition originating from outside domestic
state borders, labor is prevented from freely and fully responding to the
economic stimuli in a productive manner. That is, labor may lose its utility in
the then-existing production framework of the domestic economy (i.e., become
unemployed or underemployed) because of exposure of domestic producers to
trans-border competition in goods, services, capital, and/or ideas. However,
labor itself is prevented from competing trans-nationally due to restrictions on
trans-border employment opportunities. In addition, and more importantly, the
dislocation of labor from overwhelmed domestic producers who decrease their
production levels in response to increased competition leads to an oversupply
of labor in the domestic economy. Yet, that labor is, in large part, prevented
from responding productively to increased trans-border economic opportunities
by state constructed and defended borders and barriers to entry.36
Nevertheless, the contrast between the economic incentives available in
domestic and trans-border markets has resulted and is resulting in the
movement of labor responding to those economic stimuli.37 Further, the
legally enforced immobility of labor and the legally prohibited movement
supported by some dominant economic interests lead to exploitation of labor in
both home and target economies. The oversupply of labor (increased
unemployment or underemployment) in State A drives down or freezes the
wages offered to State A’s labor. It is the undocumented and quasi-personhood
status of illegally mobile labor in State B, and not only the mere presence of

35. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 14 (1998) (“Border controls reduce the
applicability of standard economic models by impeding the free circulation of labour as a factor
of production, and, consequently, preventing the development of international migration to its
fullest potential.”).
36. See, e.g., Caroline Brothers, European Union Passes Measure Allowing Migrants to Be
Detained 18 Months, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at A6 (discussing the passage of a European
Commission Directive mandating stricter standards and requiring the return (deportation) of
migrants to their countries of origin).
37. See, e.g., MASSEY, supra note 35, at 277.
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that labor, that facilitates the exploitation of labor in State B and may drive
down the wages of domestic labor there.38
In addition, the continued assumption and would-be enforcement of labor
immobility allows capital to substitute capital and labor trans-nationally and to
“price discriminate” in its compensation of labor. Manufacturers and some
service providers are able to outsource production to pools of cheap labor held
immobile by the national borders of host states.39 Service providers whose
services must be provided in situ, such as landscapers and roofers, are able to
access the cheap labor of the undocumented worker who, due in part to the
legal quasi-personhood imposed by the state, accepts lower wages than does
the domestic labor force.40 That acceptance and willingness on the part of the
worker who is illegally present exerts a downward pressure on the wages of
some labor providers in the host economy.41
PART III—WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LABOR
LIBERALIZATION AVOIDED
As a result of the transnational economic forces it unleashes, trade
liberalization constitutes a built-in challenge to state sovereignty and mastery
over state territory.42 Trade liberalization and globalization are de facto

38. George J. Borjas & Lawrence F. Katz, The Evolution of the Mexican-Born Workforce in
the United States 31–32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Paper No.
11281, Apr. 2005), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~gboras/Papers/w11281.pdf
(discussing the effects of Mexican immigration on the wage levels of unskilled U.S. domestic
labor).
39. Manufacturing and certain services (such as reading and interpreting x-rays or paralegal
services) are outsourced to India, for example. Further, capital’s mobility is not limited only to
transnational movement. Production processes and plants may move from one region to another
within a domestic market in order to increase transnational and domestic competitiveness. See,
e.g., Dan Danielsen, Working Borders: Linking Debates About Insourcing and Outsourcing of
Capital and Labor, Roundtable Presentation at the Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for
Human Rights and Justice Conference (Feb. 10–11, 2005), 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 692, 755–59
(2005); Louis Uchitelle, The Wage that Meant Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at WK3.
40. See THERESA HAYTER, OPEN BORDERS: THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION CONTROLS
157 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the relationship among illegality of status, ease of exploitation and
the extraction of cheap labour).
41. In the United States, for example, the increase in “illegal” immigration stems from the
increased dislocation in foreign (Mexican and other) labor markets and economic incentives to
undertake transborder movement created by incomplete labor liberalization and globalization
coupled with the increased U.S. border security and enforcement.
42. This notion appears to be so obvious as to not require an explicit statement: Through
trade liberalization agreements, states limit the flexibility of their legislative and policymaking
options with respect to trade. Trade in services, goods, capital, etc., is progressively freed from
state control. The proliferation of politically motivated regional trade agreements such as the
U.S.-Israel free trade agreement may indicate an unenunciated acknowledgement of the
integrative forces unleashed by trade liberalization. The political purpose is to more closely bind
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integrative of economies. Globalization and its engine, trade liberalization,
unleash integrative processes despite the best efforts of their wielders to limit
the scope of trade liberalization’s effects to selected aspects of domestic
economies. Confinement of trade liberalization to the movement of goods,
capital, services and ideas attempts to deny the inchoate and irrepressible
integrative processes in which globalization and trade liberalization are
clothed.43
However, the benefits anticipated from the liberalization of the movement
of goods, services and capital are incomplete where the liberalization of labor
is not also undertaken. State participants in regional trading arrangements
appear to contemplate undertaking the liberalization of labor only within the
context of deliberate/conscious initiatives toward deeper integration of member
state economies. In the Western Hemisphere, despite negotiations and
agreements to increase the integration of individual economies through
regional trading arrangements and the goals of labor liberalization espoused by
member states, the plans to liberalize labor are a largely stillborn part of a
rhetoric that has not become reality.
A.

General Introduction to Regional Trade Agreements

Regional trading arrangements—the adoption of trade liberalization
policies among groups of usually neighboring states—pre-existed the GATT’s
multilateral trade liberalization endeavor.44 Article XXIV of GATT 1947
provided an exception to the GATT’s nondiscrimination principles so that preexisting regional trading arrangements did not violate the obligations of the
GATT signatories.45 As a consequence, regional trading arrangements
continued to be formed throughout the pre-Uruguay Round functioning of the
GATT, with the number of such arrangements accelerating substantially after
1994.46
1. Espoused Purpose(s) of Regional Trading Arrangements
The goals of state parties to regional trading arrangements usually include
the economic development of domestic economies through the increase in

the member states in the regional trade arrangements to each other. In other words, the
integrative effect of economic interdependence is intended to solidify political affinities.
43. The essentially integrative aspects of trade liberalization may have been masked by the
long period of stasis (the Cold War) that followed the Bretton Woods process, which, among
other things, prevented the formation of the International Trade Organization, which had been
envisioned as the institutional embodiment of Bretton Woods-crafted trade liberalization. See
Demaret, supra note 18, at 125.
44. See, e.g., Bravo, supra note 9, at 155.
45. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XXIV.
46. See Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, supra note 27.
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trade volumes among member states.47 For example, pursuant to CARICOM’s
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas,48 the objectives of the regional grouping
include: “improved standards of living and work[,] full employment of labour
and other factors of production[, and] accelerated, coordinated and sustained
economic development and convergence . . . .”49 Other underlying factors that
contribute to the formation of such arrangements include the geographical
proximity of the member states.50 Further, pre-existing political, social,
cultural or historical ties may strengthen the economic calculus and help
overcome some barriers to entering into the arrangements.51 These underlying
contributing factors are not without economic import; they may confer
economic and institution building benefits to the regional trading
arrangement.52
The classic distinctions among RTAs are the free trade area, the customs
union and the common market.53 The free trade area is a misnomer. Trade
among member states does not become completely free, but it becomes freer
than it had been prior to entry into the RTA by virtue of lowering tariff and
non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods.54 The customs union goes a step
further by imposing a common external tariff on goods originating from
outside the regional grouping while further lowering the barriers to trade
among member states.55 The common market is the true free-trade area.
Member states remove all barriers to the movement of all factors of

47. The economic development takes place as the increased trade levels stimulate the
utilization of Individual domestic factors of production in producing the trade goods and services.
48. See generally CARICOM, Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean
Community including The CARICOM Single Market and Economy, July 5, 2001, available at
http://www.caricomlaw.org/doc.php?id=131 [hereinafter Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas].
49. Id. art. 6. See also Agentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty to Establish a Common
Market, preamble, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Treaty of Asunción]. The
Preamble to the Treaty includes in its provisions the objectives of “economic development with
social justice” and “the importance of securing . . . a proper place in the international economy.”
Id.
50. Geographic contiguity may enhance the economic logic of entering into the
arrangements. Examples from the Western Hemisphere include NAFTA, which lowers barriers
to trade among the contiguous North American states Mexico, Canada and the United States and
MERCOSUR, which lowers trade barriers among Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and
contiguous South American states.
51. For example, the majority of the CARICOM member states share a common history.
See, e.g., Bravo, supra note 9, at 167.
52. The commonality of interests and experience and a certain level of cultural homogeneity
may reduce barriers to the attainment of consensus and decrease the barriers to greater
integration. This cultural homogeneity may exist despite the existence of long-term hostilities
between contiguous states arising from historic wrongs and competition for resources.
53. Bravo, supra note 9, at 157.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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production, thus integrating their economies, while maintaining common
external tariffs and other barriers to the entry of products and factors of
production that originate outside the member states.56
That traditional typology is now inadequate. Contemporary regional
trading arrangements exhibit a variety of forms that almost defy categorization.
Extant examples include the liberalization of barriers with respect to particular
economic sectors, agreements between established RTAs and individual
countries,57 and agreements between two existing RTAs and a neighboring
country that is a member of neither RTA.58
B.

Selected Major Western Hemisphere RTAs

The Western Hemisphere regional trading arrangements discussed in this
article59 vary with respect to, among other things, length of existence, size of

56. Id.
57. The agreement between Mexico and the European Union serves as an example. See
generally Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement Between the
European Community and its Member States, of the One Part, and the United Mexican States, of
the Other Part, Dec. 8, 1997, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/mex_eu/english/Global_
e.pdf. The European Union and Chile completed a trade agreement in 2002. See generally
Association Agreement Between the European Union and Chile, Nov. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/chieu_e/cheuin_e.asp.
58. For example, the agreement executed between CARIFORUM (CARICOM plus the
Dominican Republic) and the European Union. See Press Release, EU and CARIFORUM Sign
Full EPA Agreement (Dec. 16, 2007), available at http://www.delbrb.ec.europa.eu/en/
pres_and_info/releases/Release_Num24-07_EU_CARIFORUM_conclude_EPA_agreement.pdf.
The CARIFORUM consensus surrounding the EPA subsequently dissipated, and two of the
countries declined to execute the agreement. See Rickey Singh, 13 to Sign EPA: Guyana, Haiti
Back Out of Full Agreement, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 2008. MERCOSUR and the
European Union plan to resume negotiations toward the completion of a trade pact between the
two regional groupings. See Brazil Sees EU-MERCOSUR Talks Moving Later in 2008, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article/php3?id_article=11715.
59. Although there are other RTAs in the Western Hemisphere (for a complete list of RTAs
in the Western Hemisphere, see, e.g., SICE, http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp),
CARICOM, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and DR-CAFTA were selected for detailed analysis in this
article because of the diversity that these RTAs represent. These include, for example, targeting
varying economic goals (such as gradual integration versus market access) and political purposes,
common history, disparate global economic importance of member states and of individual
RTAs, the similarity and differences of economic development status among member states, and
differences in volume of trade. Collectively, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and DRCAFTA represent the array of experiences in the Western Hemisphere, which include diversity of
geographic regions and historical experiences, as well as a spectrum of political and economic
power in the region and globally. CARICOM, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and DR-CAFTA offer a
variety of avenues for analysis—the role of geographic contiguity, historical rivalries and, for the
majority of the member states, the transition from being countries of emigration to countries of
immigration with a consequent tradition of mobility among their population. In addition, the
member states and RTAs discussed here include the two principal legal traditions (civil and
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population and volume of trade affected, as well as with respect to the types
and levels of connections among the member states. All four of the RTAs seek
to further increase economic activity and trade among member states through
successively decreasing the tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade
in goods. In some cases via amendments,60 each of the RTAs also lowers
barriers to trade in services and establishes legal regimes to emplace minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property and foreign direct
investment.61
1. CARICOM
CARICOM is a regional grouping primarily composed of former British
island colonies in the Caribbean.62 Former British colonies Belize and
Guyana, located on the Central American and South American mainland,
respectively, and former Dutch colony Suriname, are also member states.63
CARICOM was created by the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas,64 and is the
smallest and oldest of the RTAs discussed in this article, affecting a population
of 14 million.65 Key among the goals of this RTA is the creation of a common
market and the economic development of the member states. According to the
Preamble of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the objectives of the regional
grouping includes “the international competitiveness demanded by the process
of globalization . . . and the free movement of capital, labor, and technology,”
among others.66 CARICOM’s foundational treaty was amended in 1989 to
enhance the provisions geared toward the development and implementation of
a common market and to bolster the institutional framework of the
organization.67 In addition, membership was expanded to include Suriname

common law), which leads, with the exception of MERCOSUR, to an admixture of legal
traditions within each of the selected RTAs.
60. The MERCOSUR and CARICOM agreements, for example, did not originally include
liberalization of trade in services.
61. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Chapters 11 (Investment Services and Related
Matters) and 17 (Intellectual Property).
62. See Bravo, supra note 9, at 167–76 (providing description and analysis of the historical
background of the CARICOM regional grouping).
63. The fifteen member states are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
64. Barbados-Guyana-Jamaica-Trinidad and Tobago: Treaty Establishing the Caribbean
Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033.
65. Bravo, supra note 9, at 168.
66. Id. at 171.
67. See THE CARICOM SYSTEM: BASIC INSTRUMENTS 459–69 (Duke Pollard ed. 2003)
(discussing the impetus for and changes wrought by the Revised Treaty).
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and Haiti.68 However, a key centerpiece of the Revised Treaty, the Caribbean
Single Market and Economy (CSME), was not implemented until 2005.69
2. MERCOSUR
The 1991 Treaty of Asunción executed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and
Uruguay created the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR)
and became effective on December 31, 1994.70 Chile and Bolivia joined the
grouping as Associate Members in 1996,71 as did Peru in 2005.72
MERCOSUR is the second largest of the RTAs discussed in this essay and the
second largest in the Western Hemisphere.73 According to the Treaty of
Asunción, the ultimate goal of MERCOSUR is South American economic
integration,74 and the immediate purpose of the Treaty is the formation of a
common market and integration of member state economies.75 Some aspects
of the rationales for the formation of MERCOSUR appeared to mirror the
reasoning underlying the formation of the European Communities.76

68. Haiti’s membership has been largely defunct since the overthrow of President Bertrand
Aristide in 2004. Bravo, supra note 9, at 203 n.280.
69. See id. at 173–75 (discussing obstacles to Caribbean integration, which include hurdles
to the implementation of the CSME).
70. Treaty of Asunción, supra note 49, art. 1. The December 17, 1994, Supplementary
Protocol to the Asunción Agreement on the Institutional Structure of the MERCOSUR (the
Protocol of Ouro Preto) lays out the institutional structures and mechanisms for implementation
of the common market.
71. See RAFAEL A. PORRATA-DORIA, JR., MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET OF THE
SOUTHERN CONE 123–24 (2005).
72. See Acuerdo de Complementacion Economica Suscrito Entre los Gobiernos de la
Republica Argentina, de la Republic Federative del Brasil, de la Republica del Paraguay y de la
Republica Oriental del Uruguay, Estados Partes del MERCOSUR, y el Gobierno de la Republica
del Peru, Nov. 30, 2005, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/MRCSRPerACE58/ace.asp.
73. NAFTA is the largest RTA in terms of volume of trade and, due to the status of the
United States in the Western Hemisphere, is probably the most significant in the political sphere.
74. The Preamble states: “[T]his Treaty must be viewed as a further step in efforts gradually
to bring about Latin American integration,” and speaks of “increasingly close ties between [the]
peoples” of the member states. Treaty of Asunción, supra note 49.
75. Article 1 states: “The States Parties hereby decide to establish a common market, which
shall be in place by 31 December 1994 and shall be called the ‘common market of the southern
cone’ (MERCOSUR).” Among the mechanisms that will be included in the formation of the
common market are “[t]he free movement of goods, services and factors of production between
countries . . . .” Treaty of Asunción, supra note 49 (emphasis added).
76. See PORRATA-DORIA, supra note 71, at 17–21 (discussing similarities between the
Brazil-Argentina and the France-Germany relationships, such as historic enmities and the
similarity in economic relationships between the two states).
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3. NAFTA
In 1994, the United States, Mexico and Canada executed NAFTA,77
creating the largest regional grouping in the Western Hemisphere in terms of
volume of trade and size of the population of the member states. The purpose
of the establishment of the free trade area was to eliminate trade barriers
among the member states, promote fair competition, increase investment
opportunities and protect intellectual property rights.78 The goals expressed in
contemporaneous statements by the leaders of the three member states
included, among other things, increasing trade among the member states in
order to spur economic growth and increase member state prosperity.79 The
NAFTA was extremely controversial in U.S. domestic politics and continues to
evoke strong negative views and rhetoric from some politicians and a number
of civil society groups.80
4. DR-CAFTA
The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Area Agreement,
executed on August 5, 2004, among the United States, the Dominican Republic
and several Central American countries,81 replicates many of the provisions
and characteristics of NAFTA.82 As is the case with NAFTA, a key goal of
DR-CAFTA is to foster economic development and economic activity by

77. NAFTA, supra note 61.
78. See id. art. 102.
79. See, e.g., Ranko Shiraki Oliver, In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, The Treaty Gave to
Me . . . What, Exactly?: An Assessment of Economic, Social, and Political Developments in
Mexico Since 1994 and Their Impact on Mexican Immigration into the United States, 10 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 53, 62–65 (2007) (discussing the economic benefits that the NAFTA parties
sought from the trade pact).
80. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Unions Gird for War Over Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1993, at A14 (discussing organized labor’s concerns about NAFTA); David E. Rosenbaum,
Splintered on Trade; 2 Unusual Political Alliances Reflect Long-Term Gain and Short-Term
Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at B12 (summarizing arguments for and against U.S. entry into
the free trade agreement). See also Roger Lowenstein, Tariff to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2008, at 15 (discussing the anti-trade liberalization rhetoric of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
the 2008 Democratic candidates for President of the United States).
81. The Central American member states are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
and Nicaragua. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, May
28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/
DR-CAFTA_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter DR-CAFTA].
82. DR-CAFTA is one of a series of free trade agreements that the United States has
executed or negotiated since the 1994 NAFTA became effective. In each of the subsequent
agreements, the United States has been the initiator of the arrangement and has brought to the
table a template of demands that it successively revised to further enhance its trading position
within the specific regional grouping. See Cherie O. Taylor, Regionalism: The Second-Best
Option?, 28 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 155 (2008).
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increasing trade among the member states.
Although the agreement
encountered some resistance among the polity in at least one of the member
states,83 through successive signatures and ratifications the RTA is now in
force.84
The analysis of the four RTAs identifies a gap between both the purposes
of and the rhetoric employed by, on the one hand, the CARICOM and
MERCOSUR parties, and the NAFTA and DR-CAFTA parties on the other.
That gap stems from the economic integration and common market formation
goals espoused by CARICOM and MERCOSUR, which contrast with the more
superficial relationships sought by the NAFTA and DR-CAFTA parties.85 For
the latter pair of regional trade arrangements, labor liberalization is addressed
only indirectly as part of the liberalization of trade in services.
C. Overview of Treatment of Labor Liberalization under the Four Western
Hemisphere RTAs
The treatment of labor liberalization in the four referenced regional trading
arrangements in the hemisphere falls into two categories. In one category are
CARICOM and MERCOSUR, pursuant to which the member states claim to
aspire to a fundamental integration of their economies by creating a common
market.86 In the second category are NAFTA and DR-CAFTA, both of which
attempt to capture the preferential market access benefits of regional trade
liberalization while holding at bay the human aspect of the inevitable process
of integration of member state economies.
1. CARICOM
In keeping with CARICOM’s goal of a common market, the Preamble to
the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas sets forth the objective of the free

83. See Costa Rica: Trade Pact Appears to Pass, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at A6; U.S.
Trade Pact is Protested in Costa Rica, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A11.
84. However, the DR-CAFTA treaty has not yet been implemented in Costa Rica. See Costa
Rica: Delay in Trade Agreement Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at C5.
85. However, CARICOM and MERCOSUR also can be distinguished by the inner-directed
and outer-directed fear of the hegemon. The member states of MERCOSUR fear both the wouldbe/perceived South American hegemon within, Brazil, as well as the Western Hemisphere’s
acknowledged hegemon, the United States. The CARICOM member states, on the other hand,
include no state with the potential to become a regional hegemon. The member states’ fears of
domination are outwardly directed toward the United States. In light of these realities, and
dependent upon whether the RTAs decide to be active or reactive, economic integration, which
includes sanctioning of labor liberalization, may take place only as a reaction to the activities of
the United States.
86. See supra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2.
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movement of community nationals.87 However, to date, commitments to labor
liberalization have been limited to a small subset of CARICOM nationals.88
Movement is restricted to certain categories of labor, such as professionals,
skilled artists and sports figures.89 An additional provision, an establishment
clause, liberalizes movement of community nationals and legal entities for
purposes of establishing a business entity in another CARICOM member
state.90 Despite the limited implementation of the goal of free movement of
community nationals (and, therefore, of labor liberalization) and in spite of
existing state barriers, anecdotal evidence suggests the reality of substantial
intra-regional labor movement among CARICOM states and between
CARICOM states and other states and regions.91
2. MERCOSUR
The Treaty of Asunción enumerates as one of its goals the liberalization of
all factors of production92 and the creation of a single market.93 Nevertheless,

87. The Preamble of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas speaks of member state awareness
“that optimal production by economic enterprises in the Community requires the structured
integration of production in the Region, and particularly, the unrestricted movement of capital,
labour and technology.” Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 48 (emphasis added).
88. While, in Article 45, the member states commit themselves “to the goal of free
movement of their nationals within the Community,” Article 46 limits the scope of that seeming
liberalization. Id. arts. 45–46.
89. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas accords the right to seek employment in the
jurisdiction of member states to “(a) University graduates; (b) media workers; (c) sportspersons;
(d) artistes; and (e) musicians, recognised as such by the competent authorities of the receiving
Member States.” Id. at art. 46. The legal tradition of the member states requires that treaty
commitments must first be transposed into domestic law in order to become effective. Bravo,
supra note 9, at 192–94.
90. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 48, arts. 30–34 (prohibiting the imposition
of new barriers to the right of establishment of the nationals or domestic legal entities of another
member state). The establishment clause may be viewed as a capital liberalization mechanism
rather than one of labor liberalization.
91. For example, there is significant economic migration from Jamaica, a CARICOM
member state, to the Dutch territories in the Caribbean, such as St. Martin and Aruba, and to the
United States. Because of the paucity of CARICOM-generated statistical information on intraregional movement, this statement is based on anecdotal sources, such a newspaper reports and
the author’s own observations. St. Martin Moves on Immigration Problem, JAMAICA GLEANER,
Jan. 25, 2007, available at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070125/news/new66.html
(discussing St. Martin initiative to limit illegal migration with efforts directed at Jamaica,
Dominica, Guyana and Suriname). Jamaica itself is a destination for labor from other states. See,
e.g., Haitian Dancers Fire Up North-Coast Clubs, JAMAICA GLEANER, July 6, 2008, available at
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/0080706/lead/lead3.html (discussing the smuggling of
Haitian women to work as dancers in Jamaican clubs).
92. Chapter 1, article 1 provides in pertinent part that the “common market shall involve:
The free movement of goods, services and factors of production . . . .” Treaty of Asunción, supra
note 49, ch. 1, art. 1 (emphasis added).
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like CARICOM (and perhaps even more so than CARICOM), labor has not
been liberalized by the regional grouping. The rhetoric of the single or
common market is undercut by the lack of adoption or implementation of
provisions that would allow labor to respond to the economic incentives and
forces created by the liberalization of other aspects of the constituent domestic
economies of member states. Instead, MERCOSUR has followed the cosmetic
course of appearing to increase or shore up the substantive protection of labor
standards,94 while largely ignoring the pressure to liberalize labor as one of the
classic factors of production. Despite this apparent foot dragging, the creation
of the Sociolaboral Commission and other efforts at standard setting with
respect to the rights and treatment of migrant workers may imply member
states’ tacit acknowledgment of the reality of substantial intra-regional
movement of labor—a reality that is in tension with member states’ reluctance
to undertake obligations to officially open their borders to host such labor.
3. NAFTA
An underlying, if un-enunciated, goal of NAFTA was the immobilization
of Mexican labor—the desire and intent that Mexicans would, through the
operation of NAFTA, have a greater economic incentive to remain behind the
Mexico-United States border, thus breaking (or, at the very least, significantly
decreasing) the cycle of seasonal trans-border movement to the United States.95
With respect to labor, the purpose of NAFTA is to impose labor immobility
through economic development, not to liberalize labor. The expectations of
the governments of the NAFTA member states were that higher levels of
foreign direct investment and consequent job creation in Mexico, together with
upward equalization of wages, would stem immigration of low-skilled labor to
the United States.96 As a result, NAFTA does not provide for the liberalization

93. Chapter 1, article 1 states: “The States Parties hereby decide to establish a common
market, which . . . shall be called the ‘common market of the southern cone’ (MERCOSUR).” Id.
ch. I, art. 1.
94. In 1998, through the adoption of the Sociolaboral Declaration, MERCOSUR created the
Comision Sociolaboral del MERCOSUR, whose purpose is to provide a policymaking and factfinding forum related to regional labor standards. See Creación de la Comisión Socio Laboral del
MERCOSUR [Creation of the Sociolaboral Commission of MERCOSUR], Dec. 10, 1998,
MERCOSUR/GMC/Res. N15/99, English translation available at http://www.unionnetwork.org/unigraphical.nsf/527af848b17f3b51c125689b00418df6/66b31628f43d043ac12570b9
00305043/$FILE/EN-Declaraci%C3%B3n%20Sociolaboral%20del%20MERCOSUR.doc.
95. See, e.g., STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION 119 (3d ed.,
The Guilford Press 2003) (1993) (asserting that “[t]he persistence of illegal migration to the
USA . . . was taken by many as proof that a new strategy of ‘abatement’ was needed to replace or
complement a strategy of deterrence. Such considerations played a major part in the discussions
which led up to NAFTA in 1993”).
96. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 79, at 62–63 (discussing hopes that economic stability in
Mexico would decrease the number of Mexican immigrants to the United States).
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of labor and allows for the movement of skilled labor only.97 For example,
through the introduction of the Trade NAFTA (TN) visa in the United States,
which includes an application process that may be more stringent and arduous
for Mexican applicants, skilled labor from Mexico and Canada may seek
temporary trans-border employment in the United States.98 However, NAFTA
does not create unfettered rights of nationals of member states to enter the
labor market of another member state.99
4. DR-CAFTA
In DR-CAFTA, the United States turned its back on the narrow opening to
the liberalization of labor represented by the TN visas. The provisions of DRCAFTA, which reflect the snowballing increase in anti-immigrant sentiments
in the United States, are even more hostile to the liberalization of labor than is
NAFTA. The TN visa provisions of NAFTA are omitted from DR-CAFTA,
and DR-CAFTA neither creates an analogous visa category nor expands upon
the NAFTA skilled labor visa category that allows the temporary movement of
skilled labor. At the same time, DR-CAFTA replicates the provisions of
NAFTA that specifically withhold the prospect of rights of member state
nationals to access another member state’s labor market.100 However, like

97. See Ryszard Cholewinski, International Labour Law and the Protection of Migrant
Workers: Revitalizing the Agenda in the Era of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE
FUTURE OF LABOR LAW 409, 434 n.3 (John D.R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk, eds. 2006)
(“[G]eneral free movement of labour is not a feature of [NAFTA] . . . . This agreement only
facilitates the entry of specified skilled professionals and business persons into these countries.”
(citation omitted)).
98. See NAFTA, supra note 61, ch. 16, arts. 1601–1608 and annex 1603 (providing for the
temporary entry of business visitors, traders and investors, intra-company transferees and
professionals). See also Oliver, supra note 79, at 125–27 (describing the process of application
for TN visas and contrasting their use by Mexican and Canadian nationals from 1999–2005).
Ironically, the post-adoption period has seen limited use of the TN visa by skilled Mexican labor
simultaneously with a vast expansion in the trans-border movement of unskilled Mexican labor.
Id. at 117–18, 125–30.
99. Article 1607 of NAFTA carefully enumerates (and limits) the provisions that affect the
immigration laws of the NAFTA and states: “Except for [specified chapters], no provision of this
Agreement shall impose any obligation on a Party regarding its immigration measures.” NAFTA,
supra note 61, art. 1607.
100. The language of both NAFTA and DR-CAFTA echo the language of the GATS, which
makes clear that the liberalization of trade in services and the consequent removal of barriers to
the movement of some agents of service providers do not create rights to access the labor markets
of member states. See NAFTA, supra note 61, ch. 12, art. 1201 § 3, which provides in pertinent
part that:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to . . . impose any obligation on a Party with
respect to a national of another Party seeking access to its employment market, or
employed on a permanent basis in its territory, or to confer any right on that national with
respect to that access or employment . . . .
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NAFTA, DR-CAFTA conveys the superficial impression that it requires the
maintenance of existing labor standards within member states and that it
prohibits efforts to lower such standards in response to the liberalization of
trade among the member states.101 However, those protections appear to be
illusory.102
D. Analysis of Treatment of Labor under the Four Western Hemisphere RTAs
Contemporary RTAs in the Western Hemisphere address the issue of labor
through the use of three principal mechanisms. The first mechanism is a
manifestation of linkage concerns—in this case, “trade and . . . labor.”103 It
consists of the introduction of provisions in the RTA or connected to the RTA
that appear to offer the maintenance and enforcement of existing domestic law
labor standards by member states after entry into force of the RTA.104 The
provisions appear to be aimed at the protection of labor standards within and
by member states that might otherwise not have the capacity to withstand

Similarly, DR-CAFTA states: “This Chapter does not impose any obligation on a Party with
respect to a national of another Party seeking access to its employment market.” DR-CAFTA,
supra note 81, art. 11.1 § 5.
101. In DR-CAFTA, the trade and labor linkage concerns are addressed in the body of the
agreement. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 81, ch. 16. Contrast this with the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which was negotiated and drafted in response to U.S. domestic
labor union animosity to the NAFTA trade pact. North American Agreement of Labor
Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC]. See,
e.g., Adam Brower, Note, Rethinking NAFTA’s NAALC Provision: The Effectiveness of its
Dispute Resolution System on the Protection of Mexican Migrant Workers in the United States,
18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 155–57 (2008) (discussing the purposes and timeline of the
NAALC).
102. The NAALC has provided little restraint against the lowering of labor standards within
the domestic law of the NAFTA parties, and there is little prospect that the labor provisions of
DR-CAFTA will have greater protective effect on the labor standards of parties to that agreement.
See infra Part V.A.2.
103. See, e.g., NAALC, supra note 101, at 1502 (indicating that the Preamble recites the
importance of labor issues in the furtherance of NAFTA’s trade policies).
104. Examples of such instruments include the NAALC (affirming NAFTA member states’
obligations to adhere to their domestic labor standards and providing for an oversight/review
institution); the Sociolaboral Declaration of the MERCOSUR (proclaiming the support of
MERCOSUR and individual member states for the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, as well as other pertinent
international labor and human rights instruments); and the CARICOM’s Charter of Civil Society
and Labor Law Harmonization Project (whereby a panoply of workers rights are acknowledged
and attempts are made to set and harmonize labor laws of the member states). For excellent
discussions and analysis of the substantive labor law instruments and initiatives of these RTAs,
see Adelle Blackett, Toward Social Regionalism in the Americas, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
901 (2002) and Lance Compa, Labour Rights in the FTAA, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE
OF LABOR LAW, supra note 97, at 245.
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downward pressures on those standards.105 However, in the case of NAFTA
(and perhaps of DR-CAFTA as well), the provisions’ purpose was to protect
the jobs of workers in the more highly compensated labor markets of more
powerful member states through elimination of a potential incentive for the
trans-border movement of capital that might be tempted to access the lower
cost trans-border labor market.106 The would-be protectionist aims are
evidenced by subsequent lackluster impact of these provisions on NAFTA
parties and the ineffectiveness of deploying the provisions to maintain and
enforce labor standards.107
A second mechanism consists of provisions aimed at the liberalization of
trade in services. Here, trade in services is liberalized and the free movement
of capital (foreign direct investment) is enhanced by allowing the limited
movement of human agents of service providers.108
A third mechanism employed is the enumeration of specific categories of
labor providers that may move freely among member states. Some examples

105. See, e.g., Blackett, supra note 104, at 940–41 (noting that,“as individual micro-States,
which face trade liberalization and the need to compete to attract foreign investment, Caribbean
nations need mechanisms to address sensitive policy issues in a collective manner to avoid
undesirable forms of competition”).
106. While this purpose is not stated in the NAALC, it is a logical reading of the events
giving rise to the negotiation and execution of the agreement and of the rhetoric employed by the
NAFTA parties’ heads of state. See, e.g., Noemi Gal-Or, Labor Mobility Under NAFTA:
Regulatory Policy Spearheading the Social Supplement to the International Trade Regime, 15
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 365, 384 (1998).
The NAALC was proposed as a condition for congressional ratification of the
controversial NAFTA, and was designed to limit illegal migration between the United
States and Mexico, and the luring of jobs and investments away from any of the Parties.
It does not, however, address the issue of labor mobility at all. Moreover, it does not even
address labor standards.
Id. (citations omitted).
107. See, e.g., CHRISTINE KAUFMANN, GLOBALIZATION AND LABOUR RIGHTS: THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN CORE LABOUR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 191–92
(2007) (discussing inherent weaknesses and inadequate use of NAALC procedures). But see
Blackett, supra note 104, at 930 (discussing the NAALC institutions’ facilitation of greater
transparency and input by civil society actors, while acknowledging negative perceptions of the
NAALC institutional framework).
108. These provisions mimic Mode 4 of the GATS as set forth in the GATS, supra note 28.
The GATS’ conceptualization of trade in services is echoed in the four RTAs discussed in this
Article. See NAFTA, supra note 61, art. 1201; Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 48
art. 36 § 4; Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services of Mercosur, Part II (Protocolo de
Montevideo sobre el Comercio de Servicios del Mercosur), approved my MERCOSUR Decision
13/97 (Dec. 15, 1997), entered into force Dec. 7, 2005; DR-CAFTA, supra note 81, art. 11 § 14.
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of those categories include, among others, university graduates, skilled
workers, artists and sports figures.109
An additional category of trade liberalization provisions that may
tangentially impact the liberalization of labor is an establishment clause, which
permits the trans-border movement of member state nationals for the purpose
of establishing entrepreneurial business ventures.110
Analysis of the RTAs’ provisions and implementation reveals a second
gap:111 that between the rhetoric employed within the CARICOM and
MERCOSUR regional trading arrangements and the implementation actually
effected within them. Both CARICOM and MERCOSUR’s espoused primary
purpose is to create a common market, and both of these RTAs have
established a common external tariff. However, although both have discussed,
alluded to and, in the case of CARICOM, provided in constitutive instruments
for, labor liberalization as part of the creation of that common market, the
implementation of these provisions has been much slower than has been the
implementation of the elimination of barriers to, for example, the movement of
goods or capital.
On the other hand, NAFTA’s and DR-CAFTA’s treatment of labor
functions as an express denial of the integration process, in defiance of the
inescapably integrative processes stimulated by trade liberalization. NAFTA’s
purpose with respect to labor and its mobility was and continues to be the
reverse of labor liberalization.112 The member states’ expectation was that
labor would be frozen in place through the economic forces created by the
liberalization of capital and goods. That plan proved fruitless and, indeed, was
a direct result of policy makers and negotiators ignoring the pre-existing, deep
trans-border labor market links between Mexico and the United States.113
PART IV—BARRIERS TO LABOR LIBERALIZATION
The reasons for the neglect of labor liberalization within regional trading
arrangements are similar to those that underlie the neglect on the multilateral
level. The barriers to the liberalization of labor are conceptual, economic,
social, psychological and political.

109. See, e.g., Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 48, art. 46. See Gabriel Gari,
Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade in Services at the Sub-Regional Level: The
Mercosur Case, 25 PENN. ST. INTL L. REV. 659 (2007) (discussing and analyzing the
MERCOSUR trade in services regime).
110. See, e.g., id. art. 32.
111. See supra Part III.B.4 (discussing the first gap).
112. See supra Part III.C.3–4 (discussing NAFTA’s labor immobilization purpose).
113. See generally Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policy: Thinking Outside the (Big) Box, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1401, 1410–29 (2007) (discussing the deep and extensive historic links between
the United States’ and Mexico’s labor markets).
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Conceptual Barriers

Fundamental conceptual understandings underlie the neglect (and even
rejection) of labor liberalization. Linked to those conceptual understandings is
a fear of change. The first and most far-reaching of those conceptual
understandings is an unquestioning assumption of the trans-border immobility
of labor. That conceptualization coexists uneasily with the deployment of state
immigration and national security laws aimed at thwarting the movement of
labor.114
The second conceptual barrier is the vastly influential unarticulated
conception of capital or goods as neutral, especially as contrasted with labor.
This is incorrect. The introduction of a new product or good may transform
the culture and economy of a given society. For example, the owners of
capital may demand concessions and changes from the leadership and
population of State A, which may lead to transformation of the culture.115
Those transformations span the gamut of social, cultural, economic and
political spheres.116 The effects of capital infusions and introduction of new
goods may be no more subject to easy state control than is labor, in either its
individual or group forms.117
A third conceptual cause of the neglect of labor is the (perhaps willful)
lack of understanding of policymakers and politicians that trade liberalization

114. See, e.g., CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 95, at 117–20. This conceptualization
continues to exist in economic and other policymaking models despite the massive migratory
flows of the twentieth century. Id. at 68–92.
115. Think of the influence of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). For example, the BITs
executed by the United States with other countries typically include, inter alia, minimum
standards for the treatment of U.S. investors under the domestic law of the host countries, nondiscrimination (both national treatment and most favored nation) provisions, prohibitions of
constraints on the export of capital, and prohibitions of performance guarantees. See, e.g.,
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in Litigation
2006, arts. 3, 5, 7, 8 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8710, 2006).
For discussion and analysis of the spread of BITs and of their effects on less-developed countries,
see Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 265–303 (2008). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs
Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA.
J. INT’L L. 639, 639–88 (1998).
116. A quintessential example is the introduction of tea to England in the seventeenth century
by Catherine of Braganza. See United Kingdom Tea Council, www.tea.co.uk/indes.php?pgId=96
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Tea is now an integral part of English culture.
117. It is true, however, that at the extreme, capital is also restricted in its trans-border
movement. The U.S. reaction to proposed control of U.S. ports by UAE investors provides an
example. See, e.g., David S. Cloud, Port Deal’s Collapse Stirs Fears of Repercussions in
Mideast Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A10; Heather Timmons, Dubai Port Company Sells
Its U.S. Holdings to A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at C4. Such measures are usually due to
nationalist and state security concerns discussed later in this article. See infra Parts IV.D–E.
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is inherently integrative, fostering the interdependence of individual economies
and societies. The attempts to limit integration so as to constrain labor’s
responsiveness to economic incentives creates distortive effects in individual
domestic economies, as well as opportunities for exploitation within the global
market for labor.
A fourth potential conceptual barrier is a misunderstanding and fear of the
consequences of the liberalization of labor. The labor liberalization advocated
here would not serve to commoditize labor so as to facilitate labor’s increased
exploitation by others, but to free labor of constraints that now prevent it from
seeking the most competitive compensation levels.118 The liberalization of
labor would serve the human rights of individual labor providers, not sacrifice
those rights for the economic purposes of others.
A fifth conceptual barrier that underlies the neglect of labor liberalization
is the non-holistic conceptualization of humans as economic actors. It is
difficult to conduct holistic economic analysis that conveys a complete
analysis of human beings as economic actors—both producers and consumers,
as well as actors and re-actors in creating and responding to economic forces—
who at the same time possess the status of bearers of fundamental rights under
international and domestic law. Humans are intrinsically economic actors in
the roles of both producers and consumers. However, in their role as “labor”
they are often analyzed and conceived of as inherently immobile and belonging
to a particular state.
Sixth, political concepts such as statehood and sovereignty, and the
consequent protectionism, also have an impact.119 They underlie the
contemporary model of trade liberalization, which functions as an instrument
of power politics instead of as a mechanism for enhancing welfare for all
economic participants. From the political division into nation-states arises the
dominant atomized nation-state world view, as opposed to a universalized and
globalized perspective. The atomized view of the world results in the gap
between the rhetoric and language of globalization and the domestic nationstate interests that are pursued by policy makers and politicians.120
Finally, the psychological mechanisms that allow humans to adjust and
continue to function in the face of apparent injustice and random suffering—
the human belief in the fundamental justice of the human condition, that

118. See supra Part II.C.
119. See infra Part IV.E.
120. Also worthy of further exploration is the question whether the influence of the U.S.dominated emphasis on civil and political human rights, as opposed to economic, social, and
cultural rights, underlies the failure to fully conceptualize and facilitate the economic role and
functioning of individuals as autonomous economic units in a globalizing world.
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individuals get what they deserve—plays a key role.121 The belief in a just
world allows the more privileged onlooker to blame the victim and to maintain
continued belief in the essential justice and ordering of human and societal
interactions.122 If undocumented migrants are exploited, they are to blame for
their condition, so that the structural causes and the injustice of barriers to their
access to worthwhile employment conditions are not widely or fundamentally
questioned.
B.

Psychological Barriers

The psychological barriers to labor liberalization as an inherent part of
trade liberalization are based on a fear of the “Other,” cultural protectionism
and a deeper underlying fear of change. Nation-states and their citizens rely on
a mythos of homogeneity, and human psychology naturally distinguishes
between “us” and “them,” the in-group and the out-group.123 Labor
liberalization appears to be unthinkable because fear of the Other requires that
the Other be held at bay and prevented from entering the body politic. That
entry, it is feared, will bring to the host society both danger from the stranger
within as well as change.
However, change, including cultural transformation, is inevitable and
comes subtly and inevitably will-they or nil-they to both isolationist and open
societies. The flexible, open and transparent society may be able to welcome
change on its own terms and direct the path of its flow. By utilizing a longterm time horizon, it is possible to appreciate the benefits of openness and the
ability to harness change. For example, in the United States, the historically
dominant practice of welcoming immigrants brought the transformation of
waves of the “Other” into “Americans;” the society was transformed (as it
inevitably would have been), and positive economic benefits were realized.124
The dynamism, richness, strength and power of the United States experience
would have been impossible had the borders of the United States been closed
to the Others who both voluntarily entered in search of economic opportunity
and were involuntarily consigned to enslavement to the economic benefit of
others.125 Yet each wave of Americanized Others attempts to pull up the

121. See MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION
11-13 (1980).
122. Id. at 89–103 (discussing, among other things, “disidentifying” by the powerless and
“the importance of ‘deservingness’” to the norm of social responsibility).
123. See, e.g., JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: HOW ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS
OBJECT x–xi (1983); ERIC WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 354–55 (1982).
124. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Social and Economic Consequences of Exclusionary
Immigration Laws, 2 NAT’L L. GUILD Q. 171, 172–74 (1940).
125. The article’s acknowledgement of the role of trans-Atlantic slavery in supplying the U.S.
domestic labor market conveys no normative support for the exploitation.
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ladder behind it, fearful of new Others and their potentially transformative
effects.126
C. Social Barriers
The psychological barriers (fear of the Other, fear of cultural
transformation and change) are intimately intertwined with the social causes of
the failure to address labor liberalization. Fundamentally, the fear of the Other
underlies the floodgates argument—the notion that, if the barriers to entry are
liberalized through trade, the domestic life, culture, economy and polity will be
swamped by a flood of foreign-sourced Other labor.127
Intrinsic in this fear is the apprehension that the Other cannot be
assimilated and that the native will be dislocated and outnumbered. This fear
is enhanced by the use of a historically short and blinkered time horizon. The
previously mentioned example of the United States as a long-term beneficiary
of foreign-sourced trans-border labor is a key example that undermines the
power of this threatening image.128
Further, the historical evidence suggests that the flows of labor are selfcorrecting. The vast majority of Italians and Swedes did remain in Italy and
Sweden during the height of Italian and Swedish migration to the New
World.129 There are built-in checks to the prospect of floods of new labor
overwhelming the infrastructure and people of a given state. Firstly,
information asymmetries are not as stark as they were during the previous eras
of economically driven world migration.130 Would-be economic migrants
(labor attempting to sell its services to the most profitable bidder) are better
able to gauge the existence or non-existence of opportunities for employment
in a given location. The flow of responsive labor will rise and fall in response

126. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Mythology of Immigration, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE:
SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 384–89 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed. 1960).
127. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 26–27 (2007).
128. See, e.g., George J. Borjas, The Economics of Immigration, 32 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE
1667, 1713 (1994) (The author concluded that “there was little evidence to suggest that
immigrants had an adverse impact on native employment opportunities. Overall, the empirical
evidence painted a very optimistic picture of the contributions of immigrants to the American
economy.”).
129. The same is true of the Irish, even in the throes of the Potato Famine. Other illustrative
contemporary examples include the movement between, for example, the U.S. mainland and
Puerto Rico or among the states of the United States. JOHNSON, supra note 127, at 28–29. That
is, despite the many advantages that California enjoys, not all U.S. residents have or will relocate
there from other states.
130. See, e.g., Sara Corbett, Can the Cellphone Help End Global Poverty?, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Apr. 13, 2008, at 35 (discussing the economic benefits of the enhanced access to
information through cell phones). See also Tom Arango, Market Data, Far From the Market,
THE N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008, at BU4.
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to the economic stimuli of individual labor markets. Secondly, for a number of
reasons, including fear of the new and of the difficulties of adjustment to a new
society and culture and diminished social status as the Other, many individual
purveyors of labor will not wish to leave familiar social and cultural
circumstances. Thirdly, as excess (unemployed or underemployed) labor
leaves State A for State B, thus decreasing the domestic supply in State A’s
labor market, the compensation paid to labor in State A may rise and give late
movers incentives to continue to remain at home in order to take advantage of
the improved compensation in the domestic labor market. Other built-in
checks include sticky domestic obligations, such as patriotism or familial
and/or other obligations.
D. Economic Barriers
The economic barriers to the liberalization of labor are intimately
connected with the conceptual and psychological barriers discussed earlier in
this Part. Those economic rationales are varied and wide-ranging. They
include fear of the economic consequences of the liberalization of labor,
protectionism for entrenched interests and an unconscious bias toward the
benefits to be derived from and desirability of capital.
Principal among the feared economic consequences is the danger of
downward wage equalization.131 The lowering of barriers to the movement of
labor will, it is feared, expose domestic workers to competition which, through
over-supply, will cause the compensation of labor in the broad domestic
market to decrease. This fear appears to be valid but is both too narrowly
focused and suffers from an overly short-term perspective. Domestic labor
throughout the world already is exposed to competition.132 The contemporary
model of trade liberalization allows capital to respond to the global
competition among domestic labor markets through liberalized trans-border
movement, but it prevents the majority of individual labor providers from
doing so. Thus, capital may move jobs and entire production facilities at its
discretion in response to fluctuating economic stimuli, such as, for example,
taking advantage of lower wages in other domestic markets.133
The status quo advantages capital over labor. While capital may move in
response to competition, capital may simultaneously impose lower wages on
domestic labor by threatening to relocate as well as through hiring illegally
present foreign-sourced labor with unequal legal status. Yet, for a very long
time and until relatively recently, labor unions in domestic markets largely

131. See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, IMMIGRATION: THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTS
4 (1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/pr-immig.html.
132. The cost-benefit economic analysis that leads to the erection of barriers to labor
liberalization employs a very short time horizon.
133. Via outsourcing and closure of production facilities in State A and reopening in State B.
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opposed the liberalization of labor.134 Two factors may explain that
opposition. First, vested labor, thus far, has been able to maintain a superior
compensation status vis-à-vis incoming labor;135 and organized labor may be
employing a short-term and narrowly focused perspective that leaves it
unaware of its impending potential obsolescence and irrelevance as it becomes
unable to demand an equitable share of the benefits of production for labor.
Second, the owners of capital have captured the dominant economic rhetoric
and the penetration and persuasiveness of that rhetoric challenge the ability of
the average worker to engage knowledgeably in the discussion regarding
whether it is more advantageous for labor to be less well-compensated in situ
or to be unemployed. The reverberation effects of the closure of production
facilities may be worse for the domestic economy as a whole than would be a
decline in compensation resulting from increased supply of labor to domestic
markets.136
A final economic reason for the neglect of labor liberalization is related to
the psychological and social fear of economic inundation. Will the
infrastructure and social entitlement programs available to the citizens and
nationals of State A in State A be overwhelmed by the demands of an influx of
newly liberalized foreign-sourced labor? First, it would be possible to
structure labor liberalization so as to limit access of foreign-sourced labor to
such programs.137 Second, most economists agree that the positive echo

134. Following long years of anti-immigrant policies, labor unions in the United States have
begun to change their position on this issue. The dwindling power of and decreasing participation
in unions, among other things, have led to a reversal, such that organized labor now advocates
pro-immigrant positions. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 127, at 146–48. See also HAYTER,
supra note 40, at xxv; JULIE R. WATTS, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
GLOBALIZATION: UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS IN UNLIKELY ALLIANCE 2–3 (2002) (describing and
analyzing trade union response to immigration in the European Union). Like the nineteenth
century anti-slavery campaigns in Britain supported by the developing British working class, this
change in labor union policy is an example of the operation of Professor Derrick Bell’s interest
convergence theory. See Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy between Modern Trafficking in
Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. J. INT’L L. 207, 243 n.182 (2007).
135. See, e.g., Uchitelle, supra note 39.
136. Substantive labor rights, pensions and health care plans created quasi-property rights of
labor in the product of its labor, and forced capital to share with labor the benefits of economic
production. Those quasi-property rights have been successively trimmed through the diminution
in the status of labor unions and other bargaining collectives. For example, through concessions
from unionized workers, U.S. car companies offer lower compensation and benefits to newly
hired employees. Id.
137. Creative use of provisions that link certain benefits to immigration status and economic
status would decrease some of these anticipated demands. Such tactics have already been
deployed in the United States. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade:
The Economic Gains from the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 371, 391–92 (1998) (discussing the restricted access of immigrants to U.S. social
entitlement programs). See also JOHNSON, supra note 127, at 151. Such provisions do run
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effects of immigrant presence and consumer and other economic activities
outweigh the costs imposed on society by immigrants.138 Further, contrary to
popular perception, the presence of such foreign-sourced labor may facilitate
the continued presence and competitiveness of production facilities in the host
state (the United States, for example) that might otherwise have been subjected
to trans-border relocation.139 While there is no definitive determination of the
positive or negative net fiscal effects of increased immigration, most
professional economists tend to believe that the positive flows outweigh the
costs.140
Finally, nativist protectionism underlies the economic arguments—the
reluctance to confer to outsiders access to the economic benefits of the
domestic labor market.
That protectionism is both shortsighted and
counterproductive and fails to acknowledge the vibrancy and positive aspects
for economies that have access to and utilize a mobile labor force.
E.

Political Barriers

The political barriers to the liberalization of labor in the context of trade
liberalization are intertwined with the conceptual, social, psychological and
economic barriers. The very structure and nature of the world’s organization
into nation-states, with dominating fundamental concepts of sovereignty,
nation-state nationalism and concepts of citizenship and belonging, as well as
the denial and political cowardice of leaders, are some of the contributing
political factors that lead to the neglect of labor liberalization within the
broader trade liberalization project. Labor liberalization is unthinkable and off
the table because it is thought that its benefits may not accrue to those within
the borders of more powerful states, while the world’s political organization
into states imposes limited obligations on individual states toward non-citizens
outside their borders.
That borders are artificial, that states are artificial constructs created and
maintained for efficiency of organization and resource harnessing on a

counter to liberal traditions of welcoming the Other. See SEYLA BEHHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF
OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 4–6 (2004); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens:
The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. OF POL. 251, 259–60 (1987).
138. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 131, at 3–4;Borjas, supra note 128, at 1698; Angela M.
Kelley, The Economic Impact of Immigration, IMMIGRATION DAILY, http://www.ilw.com/
articles/2008/0107-Kelley.shtm. In the United States, the positive contributions include payments
into social security funds with limited possibility of later access, payment of taxes through the
fraudulent use of existing Social Security numbers and rejuvenation of abandoned neighborhoods.
See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 127, at 139–40.
139. JOHNSON, supra note 127, at 148–49.
140. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 138. See also David Card, Keynote Address at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Research Event: Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? (Apr. 29,
2005), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/conf/immigration/card.pdf.
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naturally borderless globe impinges little on public political conceptions. The
political organization of the globe into nation-states focuses political interests
within constructed borders and toward the mechanisms that will protect the
interests of those within the borders. Political energies then are directed
toward border protection and enforcement and toward benefiting those things
and people internal to the border while defending against the external or
attempting to mold the external to create advantages for internal interests.141
The constructed artificiality of states has become the overwhelming default
reality, and global interests are often neglected.142
Working from that constructed reality and hampered by nation-state
borders, politicians and the polity concentrate on sovereign prerogatives, the
defense of borders and narrow domestic interests. Lost is the fact that borders
are endlessly porous, that the globe is a unit, and that even the circumscribed
trade liberalization model undertaken thus far has already integrated domestic
economies into a global whole.143
The political competition against the trans-border Other may impoverish
both State A and State B, even though collaboration might have brought greater
shared prosperity. As noted in the context of economic causes of the lack of
labor liberalization,144 the irony is that failure to liberalize labor redounds to
the detriment of those within the borders as well as those outside, while
liberalization of labor would enlarge access to the benefits of trade
liberalization to a larger number of beneficiaries.145 For example, to post-

141. HAYTER, supra note 40, at 151–52 (“Most of the arguments for and against immigration
controls are expressed in terms of the interests of nations and their current inhabitants, rather than
of the peoples of the world as a whole.”).
142. See, e.g., Willem van Schendel & Itty Abraham, Introduction: The Making of Illicitness,
in ILLICIT FLOWS AND CRIMINAL THINGS: STATES, BORDERS, AND THE OTHER SIDE OF
GLOBALIZATION 5 (Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham eds., 2006).
Most social science is expressly and unconsciously bound by state boundaries, categories
that are reproduced within institutionally sanctioned academic specializations, e.g.,
Brazilian political science or the sociology of France. Hence, it is no surprise that the
field of knowledge that seeks to understand the world beyond the state, international
relations, nonetheless takes the state as its foundational unit of analysis.
Id. Examples of issues that require a more global perspective and that have become more clear
and urgent include the environment (water and air), food sources and energy.
143. The U.S. mortgage crisis, global oil prices, food scarcity and tainted drugs and toys are
only the most extreme examples of the contemporary interdependence of domestic economies.
See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, From Six-Year Drought in Australia, a Global Crisis Over Rice, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A1; Paul Krugman, Grains Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008; Jad
Mouawad, Rapidly Rising Global Demand for Oil Is Provoking New Energy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2007, at A24.
144. See supra Part IV.D.
145. In the European Union, the populations of individual member states, as well as
individual domestic economies, have enjoyed economic growth and greater prosperity as a result
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WWII Germany and France the benefits of increased integration were greater
economic prosperity and stability for both states as well as the diminution,
through the mechanisms of greater interaction and interdependence, of transborder hostility between those two states and within the rest of Europe.
Familiarity and interdependence can breed tolerance.
The nation-state’s reification of the border and the illusion of border
control limit political and economic vision. Political cowardice prevents
policymakers from leveling with their polity and acknowledging that trade
liberalization is inevitably integrative; that transformation of the society’s
economy is beyond the state’s ability to control; and that the challenges and
costs of trade liberalization are already here. The open questions are whether
and when those costs will be recognized and to what or whom they will be
attributed. Politicians and policy makers attempt to deny or disregard the
short-term costs of trade liberalization while, at the same time, emphasizing the
long-term benefits and failing to ease the transition pains of those who are
negatively affected. Further, there is little open discussion regarding the costs
of not pursuing real trade liberalization. What benefits would attempted
economic isolation achieve? Even if the overwhelming trend toward trade
liberalization could be reversed without wholesale economic and other
disruption, the prosperity of countries which attempt to return to autarkic
production would be severely decreased.
Further, in the United States, for example, there is widespread failure to
openly acknowledge that some of the regional trading arrangements are driven
by political—that is, power retention, demonstrations of political support, and
influence gathering—considerations of the executive, rather than by immediate
economic concerns.146
Finally, the profound inability to look beyond nation-state lenses and the
neglect of labor liberalization may reveal deep skepticism regarding the
fundamental theories of trade liberalization. That neglect undermines access to
the benefits of trade liberalization for the vast majority of the world’s
economic actors and would-be beneficiaries.
PART V—EXPERIMENTING WITH LABOR LIBERALIZATION NOW? PROSPECTS
FOR THE FUTURE
Now is the time to liberalize labor as part of the broader global
liberalization of trade. Failure to do so betrays fundamental concepts of both

of freedom of movement and the ability to respond to labor market opportunities throughout the
Union.
146. The free trade agreements that the United States has executed with Israel, Jordan and
Chile serve as examples. The texts of these treaties are available from the web site of the U.S.
Trade Representative. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/
Trade_Agreements/Section_Indes.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
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classical and neoclassical economics and of the theory of comparative
advantage on which the contemporary trade liberalization project is based.
Transnational labor market competition is inevitable and already is a
fettered reality. The question is whether capital alone will continue to be
liberalized and permitted to arbitrage the differences in wage levels or whether
labor will be liberalized to take advantage of those opportunities as well. The
status quo allows capital to price discriminate with respect to how much labor
can and will be compensated. The effect of that price discrimination is to
create incentives for the movement of labor from one state to another in search
of higher compensation. However, when that labor crosses the border outside
of the legal and regulatory contexts created and maintained by the host and
home states, that labor may be condemned to quasi-personhood within the host
state. That quasi-personhood permits the creation and maintenance of
exploitative relationships between labor and consumers of labor. That very
exploitation then undermines the substantive protections of the capital-labor
relationship that were either created by and/or were to be protected pursuant to
the RTA agreement.147
Further, the failure to liberalize labor in the face of economic forces that
compel the unsanctioned movement of labor across borders consigns mobile
labor to an unequal status vis-à-vis both capital and domestic (host state) labor.
The consequences for domestic labor may include both less effective
enforcement of labor standards as well as a decrease in compensation as the
foreign-sourced labor accepts lower compensation from capital than would be
demanded by similarly employed domestic labor.
A.

Effects of Failure to Liberalize Labor
1. On RTAs Generally

The trade distortive effects of the failure to liberalize labor within the
context of regional trade arrangements concentrate and lengthen the
transitional periods following the implementation of trade liberalization. The
distortive effects, also present in the context of multilateral trade liberalization,
are more highly concentrated within RTAs. Labor that is prevented from
responding to the economic incentives and forces stimulated by liberalization
of other factors of production may be forced to respond through either
intrastate or trans-border movement despite the lack of legal sanction for such
movement. The omission of labor from the trade liberalization arsenal neither
preserves the level of compensation of labor in higher-wage markets (i.e., does

147. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the efforts within the
CARICOM, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and DR-CAFTA regimes to maintain existing labor
standards).
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not prevent downward wage equalization) nor facilitates the upward movement
of wage levels in the lower-wage member state.148 This effect undermines a
key purpose of the formation of RTAs: the improvement of standards of living
of domestic labor through increased trade volumes, economic activity and
employment levels.
2. On RTAs in the Western Hemisphere
That betrayal of both trade liberalization theory and free market principles
contributes to transition pains and inadequate dissemination of the benefits
anticipated from regionalism. The specific effects of the neglect of labor
liberalization in the Western Hemisphere include increased flows of illegal
migration149 and a decline in substantive labor standards. Using the example
of NAFTA, for example, it is clear that despite the would-be protective effects
of the NAALC (NAFTA side agreement), labor protection standards in the
workplace have declined in the United States. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Hoffman Plastics, which withheld substantive labor law protections from
undocumented employees,150 may serve to effectuate a further loosening and
lowering of the labor standards to which employers in the United States must
adhere.151 Examples from the two other NAFTA parties include the Abscal
Plan introduced in the Mexican Congress, which would “flexibilize” Mexico’s
federal labor law,152 and the decision by the Canadian province of British

148. The downward movement in the compensation of U.S autoworkers is a quintessential
example. Uchitelle, supra note 39.
149. One example is the flow of labor between the United States and Mexico as a result of
NAFTA. Anecdotal evidence suggests the same for CARICOM and MERCOSUR. The
prospects are similar for DR-CAFTA, since DR-CAFTA’s labor immobility goals and provisions
are even stronger than those of the NAFTA Agreement.
150. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002).
151. Maria Pabon Lopez, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States Legal
System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison with Argentina’s
Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301 (2005). The nation-state blinders that
constrain the courts lead them to undermine the very interests (safety of domestic workers) that
they purport to protect. The difficulty of reaching a negotiated consensus on applicable labor
standards, the disparate analyses that would be applied by domestic courts and the limited
enforcement powers of international standard-setting bodies mean that it is unlikely that a
transnational standard-setting mechanism, standing alone, would create the benefits to labor that
could be achieved through labor liberalization. Instead, standard setting, maintenance and
enforcement must work in tandem with the liberalization of labor. The transnational labor
citizenship suggested by Professor Jennifer Gordan is one potential mechanism for facilitating
labor liberalization while maintaining labor standards. See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor
Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 561–78 (2008).
152. A NAALC complaint was filed against Mexico in response to the proposed changes.
U.S. NAO Public Submission US 2005-01, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Feb. 17, 2005,
https://www.exchange.iu.edu/owa/attachment.ashx?attach=1&id=RgAAAAA0hLJNHEMGRrDj
D471IaeCBwD1n2wC0EtmRrNP3Fj0%2facQAAAAO02KAAD4QoKsx9COTqr0XdQkw5leAB
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Columbia to close down the Human Rights Commission that administered the
province’s labor law standards.153
B.

RTAs Provide Excellent Opportunity for Experimentation

Regional trading arrangements provide excellent opportunities for
experimentation. Firstly, RTAs are free to experiment with labor liberalization
as “trade in labor” because labor is not a subject of the GATT. Participants in
a regional trading arrangement would not violate their GATT obligations if
labor were to be liberalized under the RTA agreement.154
Secondly, the opportunity to experiment with labor liberalization among
RTAs would function as training wheels for multilateral liberalization.155 A
quintessential example of the migration of trade liberalization principles from
the regional to the multilateral sphere is the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement
as one of the obligatory multilateral agreements entry into which is required of
WTO Member States.156 Many of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
were negotiated and adopted in the context of the NAFTA and introduced into
the Uruguay Round.157
A third factor that militates in favor of experimenting with labor
liberalization in the context of RTAs is the interplay of geographic proximity
(enjoyed by a majority of the member states in all four of the RTAs discussed
in this Article (CARICOM, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, DR-CAFTA)) with the
enhanced homogeneity of political, economic and social circumstances that
stem from often intertwined histories of participation in or subjection to shared
experiences. For example, the member states of MERCOSUR and CARICOM
have shared experiences of colonization and enslavement, among other
historical forces, together with significant informal intra-regional movement of
labor. This homogeneity and geographic proximity (enhanced by geographic

l1z4a4AAAJ&attid0=EAC5fkw0c07YTqeC0biJbZ9w&attcnt=1. See Michal Kohout, The New
Labor Law Culture and Labor Law Reform in Mexico, 35 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 135 (2008)
(analyzing labor law reform in Mexico).
153. The Swift Demise of B.C.’s Human Rights Commission, NAT’L UNION OF PUB. AND
GEN. EMPLOYEES, Nov. 18, 2002, http://www.nupge.ca/news_2002/news_no02/n18no02a.htm.
154. Pursuant to Article V of the GATS, labor market integration may be a proper subject of a
regional trading arrangement. GATS, supra note 28, art. V. Moreover, the provision is
permissive only and does not appear to impose any hard obligation on the participants. Id.
Therefore, RTAs that experiment with labor liberalization are unlikely to violate their GATT
obligations.
155. Much in the way that it is claimed that RTAs may prepare states for accession to the
WTO. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A
New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 423–35 (2001).
156. TRIPS agreement, supra note 19.
157. Compare, NAFTA, supra note 61, art. 1701, § 2, with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19,
at 85.
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contiguity) may facilitate the management of the logistics of labor
liberalization and of the transition pains that may come from the pressure to
openly integrate the labor markets. With respect to smaller RTAs, such as
CARICOM, the movement of labor would be less unwieldy due to the smaller
scale of the populations at issue. The smaller scale would also lessen the
challenges of the expected disruption during the necessary transition phases.
A potential drawback of labor liberalization within the context of RTAs is
one that is shared with all other aspects of trade liberalization within RTAs:
liberalization of any additional factor of production may further strengthen the
trade diversion forces and pressures already attributed to RTAs.158 This
potential drawback, however, does not negate the prospective benefits of
experimenting within RTAs. So long as states continue to be leery of adding
labor liberalization to the broader multilateral trade liberalization enterprise
under the auspices of the WTO, RTAs remain the second best (and perhaps
even the best) alternative for controlled experimentation. In addition, since
other trade diversion consequences already may be in effect as a result of the
proliferation of RTAs, it is unclear that the trade diversion consequences that
would stem from labor liberalization would significantly worsen those that
may exist as a result of other aspects of trade liberalization within RTAs.
1. Existing Examples of Successful Experimentation
The European Union and federal states such as the United States, Canada
and Germany provide extant examples of experimentation with labor
liberalization. Throughout the United States, Canada and Germany, each of
which is a federal state, labor may move without hindrance in search of
productive economic activities or for other reasons. The introduction of
freedom of movement within the European Union as part of the Four Freedoms
aimed at the creation of a single market159 has allowed the freer movement of
individuals. The examples provided by these political entities demonstrate that
labor liberalization which is provided for within those contexts results in some
dislocation, but also allows for swifter responses to economic stimuli.160
Opportunities for experimentation are not irrevocably lost. While perhaps
overwhelmingly difficult in the multilateral context due to the larger number of

158. The debate regarding the trade-diversion or trade-promotion effects of RTAs has elicited
a great deal of scholarly thought. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Preferential Trade Agreements:
The Wrong Road, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 865, 866 (1995) (introducing the term
“preferential trading agreements” to encompass all types of regional trading arrangements).
159. See, e.g., BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 215–21.
160. For example, in the United States, the citizens of Oklahoma who were devastated by the
dust storms of the early twentieth century were able to move legally and freely to other states in
search of economic opportunity. That movement facilitated the economic recovery of Oklahoma
and contributed to the economic growth of states who received the interstate economic migrants.
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interests represented at the negotiating tables, within regional trading
arrangements opportunities to experiment would be facilitated by courageous
economic theoreticians and politicians, and the expansion of conceptual
frameworks surrounding issues of sovereignty, global versus nation-state
interests, and the nature of membership and “Other-”ness in the polity. In
tandem must come the education of the polity to adopt a non-blinkered reality
and the acknowledgement of the true short-term costs and benefits of the
distortive choices of the existing half- and hard-hearted trade liberalization.
C. Labor Liberalization Now?
Labor liberalization would expand access to the benefits of trade
liberalization to include a wider range of economic actors, including both
sending and receiving states. The free movement of labor would more closely
integrate labor-rich economies into the global economy, more widely disperse
the benefits of trade liberalization and acknowledge the already vibrant and
irrevocable interdependence among domestic economies.
With labor
liberalization, labor-rich states would be permitted to flexibly supply the labor
demands of the global market by specializing in and exploiting their
comparative advantage, but on terms that are more beneficial to the individuals
and groups who provide that labor. Further, closer integration of labor-rich
and labor-poor economies will facilitate, rather than impede, democratized
access to the economic opportunities and stimuli unleashed by globalization.
The distortive effects of the neglect of labor liberalization contribute to
severe human rights abuses that arise from the easily exploited conditions of
labor that moves in response to economic forces but whose movement is not
sanctioned by states.161 To liberalize labor is to decrease the opportunities for
exploitation that arise from the “illicit” movement of labor responding to trade
liberalization forces. Included on the spectrum of exploitation may be the
price discrimination practiced by capital, which handicaps labor vis-à-vis
capital as both factors of production compete and collaborate in the global
marketplace. In the current model, mobile capital is able to seek out evercheaper involuntarily immobile labor for exploitation, while that labor is
largely prevented from responding to cross-border economic stimuli.

161. See, e.g., Anna Zalewski, Note, Migrants for Sale: The International Failure to Address
Contemporary Human Trafficking, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 113 (2005). See also
Rutvica Andrijasevic, The Difference Borders Make: (Il)legality, Migration and Trafficking in
Italy Among Eastern European Women in Prostitution, in UPROOTINGS/REGROUNDINGS:
QUESTIONS OF HOME AND MIGRATION 251, 262 (Sara Ahmed et al. eds., 2003) (stating that
European Union border protection and anti-immigrant policies and methodologies “work in
favour of third parties who organize trafficking, whether individuals and agencies, because they
become a kind of supplementary migration system . . .”).
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Further, despite state reluctance to make multilateral or regional
commitments or enter into negotiations about the liberalization of labor, the
trans-border trade in labor already exists and states, individuals and criminal
enterprises are active participants. Examples include the recruitment of skilled
workers (for example, doctors and nurses from African nations to the United
Kingdom and other parts of the developed world162 and the recruitment of
teachers from the Caribbean by the New York City school system163) and
unskilled labor (for example, the use of the H-2A and H-2B visas in the United
States to satisfy seasonal demands for labor).164 Other examples include the
construction of economic development models dependent upon the transborder trade in human capital, such as the recruitment of skilled and unskilled
labor from South Asia (Pakistan165 and the Philippines166) to the Gulf States
and the developed world.

162. See, e.g., Daniel Morris, Giving Aid with One Hand, Taking MDs with the Other,
TheStar.com, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/243777; MALAWI: Donors and
Govt Pool Funds Against Brain Drain, IRIN, May 28, 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/
Report.aspx?ReportId=72414.
163. See, e.g., Regional Education Ministers to Discuss Teacher Recruitment, JAMAICA
OBSERVER, May 27, 2002, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20020526t2
20000-0500_26159_obs_regional_education_ministers_to_discuss_teacher_recruitment.asp;
Commonwealth Countries Reach Agreement on Teacher Recruitment, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Sept.
8, 2004, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040907t200000-0500_658
84_obs_commonwealth_countries_reach_agreement_on_teacher_recruitment_________.asp.
164. See, e.g., SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), http://www.splcenter.org/pdf/static/SPLCguest
worker.pdf; DAVID GRIFFITH, AMERICAN GUESTWORKERS: JAMAICANS AND MEXICANS IN THE
U.S. LABOR MARKET 45–75 (2006) (describing the extensive U.S. seasonal agricultural and
services guestworker labor programs and the endemic abuses and exploitation of the workers).
165. See, e.g., The Overseas Employment Corporation of Pakistan, http://www.oec.gov.pk/
english/en_index.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (overseeing the export of labor from Pakistan).
See also Graeme Hugo & Charles Stahl, Labor Export Strategies in Asia, in INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET 174–97 (Douglas S. Massey & J.
Edward Taylor eds., 2004) (discussing the labor export development strategies of a number of
Asian states).
166. See Jason DeParle, A Good Provider Is One Who Leaves, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr.
22, 2007, at 53. The trade pact recently executed by the governments of the Philippines and
Japan provides for limited liberalization of the movement of skilled labor between the two
countries. Japan, Philippines Sign Free-Trade Agreement, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 10,
2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060910a2.html (noting that “a
limited number of Filipino nurses and caregivers who meet certain qualifications designated by
Manila will be allowed to work in Japan, on condition they pass Japanese examinations or
graduate from specified training facilities in Japan”). However, the trade agreement has not yet
been ratified by the Philippine Senate. Japan Agrees to Amend Trade Treaty, MANILA
STANDARD TODAY, June 18, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/
?page=news4_june18_2008.
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In addition, the contemporary massive global migration flows, while partly
due to the flow of refugees from conflict situations, is largely composed of
economic migrants who evidence labor’s attempt to respond productively to
global economic forces. Often, however, labor is foreclosed from responding
in accordance with existing law. Labor’s response is deemed illegal by the
interposition of nation-state-centered domestic law between human economic
actors and transnational economic forces. Labor liberalization would confer
legally recognized and enforceable autonomy—freedom of movement167—to
labor as labor seeks to respond to market forces. Surely that response is a
fundamental manifestation of free market theory.
Finally, people, too, are economic actors, as are states and other legal
entities, such as corporations and other profit-seeking legal entities. Labor
liberalization will create more choices for human labor as autonomous
economic actors as labor i.e., humans, are re-conceptualized as integrated
economic actors—not merely cabined into silos as labor or consumers or
humans beings.
The potential for sizeable infrastructure costs suggests that labor
liberalization should be gradually implemented in order to put in place and test
the shock absorption mechanisms of particular states. Some implementation
issues not addressed here and left for future exploration include, for example,
the logistics of transition, such as gradual sectoral implementation of labor
liberalization and/or initial limitation of liberalization of labor to selected
categories of labor that are more responsive to immediate market demands.
Other issues include adoption of trans-border credentials recognition,
negotiation of eligibility for and rights to social entitlements, and the
avoidance of the creation of second-class status for foreign-sourced labor
through the provision of avenues for legal permanent residence and
participation in the polity. The decades-long efforts of the European Union in
this area, while by no means perfect, may provide useful models for
implementation.

167. The freedom of movement currently recognized in international human rights
instruments protects movement in two of three senses only—movement within the native state,
and movement out of the native state, but not movement into a new state. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, 6 I.L.M. 372 (1967) (recognizing individual
freedom of movement within countries and the right to leave the territory of any country, but no
right to enter a country of which the individual is not a citizen).
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PART VI
CONCLUSION—THE WAY FORWARD
Trade liberalization inevitably leads to de facto integration of
economies.168 Globalization and its engine, trade liberalization, unleash
integrative processes, despite the best efforts and short-sightedness off its
wielders. Confinement of trade liberalization to the movement of goods,
capital and services attempts to deny the inchoate and irrepressible integrative
processes integral to globalization and trade liberalization.169
The geographic proximity of member states and other pre-existing
interrelationships increases interdependence and integration of the member
states of regional trade arrangements. Further, by its very nature, as a result of
the economic forces that it unleashes, trade liberalization constitutes a built-in
challenge to state sovereignty and mastery over state territory.
Failure to liberalize labor, a key factor of production, is distortive and
leads to flows of undocumented labor seeking to respond to the integrative and
transformative pressures of the unleashed economic forces. The failure to
acknowledge labor’s status as a mobile factor of production and independent
subject of trade liberalization signals that trade liberalization, instead of
deployment as a tool for conferring benefits to a wide range of economic
actors, is instead being used to maintain the power-subordination status of
existing players.
In order to mold the institutions and processes of globalization to
maximize welfare enhancing benefits, policy makers need to adopt a leap of
perception from that of nationality- and border-based us-versus-them to one of
common humanity and global interests.
This leap would entail the
development of a global viewpoint and interest protection, as opposed to statecentered ones, together with extreme political courage and honesty about
economic realities and the causes and effects of the transformations stimulated
and fostered by trade liberalization. In turn, from individual polities, such
telling and accepting would require societal courage and transformation.

168. Economies are just as integrated as are the environment, climate and other factors; states
and borders are the anomalies. See Bradsher, supra note 143; Krugman, supra note 143;
Mouawad, supra note 143.
169. The essentially integrative aspects of trade liberalization may have been concealed by the
long period of stasis (the Cold War) that followed the Bretton Woods process.
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